Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. / Jensen, Thomas.

Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2013. s. 27.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Jensen, T 2013 'Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality' Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, Kbh., s. 27. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236049>

APA

Jensen, T. (2013). Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. (s. 27). Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Bind 13 Nr. 3 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236049

Vancouver

Jensen T. Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. Kbh.: Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet. 2013, s. 27.

Author

Jensen, Thomas. / Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2013. s. 27 (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 3, Bind 13 ).

Bibtex

@techreport{0c932e546fa4454ba8aeea4c7bc2f3b5,
title = "Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality",
abstract = "The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Non-revealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that canddates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, electoral competition, candidate quality, information, polarization, uncertainty",
author = "Thomas Jensen",
note = "JEL Classification: D72",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "3",
pages = "27",
publisher = "{\O}konomisk institut, K{\o}benhavns Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "{\O}konomisk institut, K{\o}benhavns Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality

AU - Jensen, Thomas

N1 - JEL Classification: D72

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Non-revealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that canddates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.

AB - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Non-revealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that canddates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - electoral competition

KW - candidate quality

KW - information

KW - polarization

KW - uncertainty

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

SP - 27

BT - Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality

PB - Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet

CY - Kbh.

ER -

ID: 46766883