Decision-making by an authority under influence

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Standard

Decision-making by an authority under influence. / Tranæs, Torben.

I: Economics Letters, Bind 43, Nr. 1, 1993, s. 35-39.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Tranæs, T 1993, 'Decision-making by an authority under influence', Economics Letters, bind 43, nr. 1, s. 35-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U

APA

Tranæs, T. (1993). Decision-making by an authority under influence. Economics Letters, 43(1), 35-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U

Vancouver

Tranæs T. Decision-making by an authority under influence. Economics Letters. 1993;43(1):35-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U

Author

Tranæs, Torben. / Decision-making by an authority under influence. I: Economics Letters. 1993 ; Bind 43, Nr. 1. s. 35-39.

Bibtex

@article{cf0c066074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Decision-making by an authority under influence",
abstract = "A characteristic set of decision problems is given when an authority has to choose between a finite number of alternatives and is being influenced by a number of parties. For instance, the location of a firm when local authorities are competing for being the host, various types of lobbyism, or when a manager is being influenced by deputies. This paper argues that these problems can be analyzed as decision-making in a hierarchy using a common-agency framework. The main result is that even when the influential parties act simultaneously and the strategy sets are discrete, solutions to such decision problems as pure-strategy equilibria exist",
author = "Torben Tran{\ae}s",
year = "1993",
doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "35--39",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Decision-making by an authority under influence

AU - Tranæs, Torben

PY - 1993

Y1 - 1993

N2 - A characteristic set of decision problems is given when an authority has to choose between a finite number of alternatives and is being influenced by a number of parties. For instance, the location of a firm when local authorities are competing for being the host, various types of lobbyism, or when a manager is being influenced by deputies. This paper argues that these problems can be analyzed as decision-making in a hierarchy using a common-agency framework. The main result is that even when the influential parties act simultaneously and the strategy sets are discrete, solutions to such decision problems as pure-strategy equilibria exist

AB - A characteristic set of decision problems is given when an authority has to choose between a finite number of alternatives and is being influenced by a number of parties. For instance, the location of a firm when local authorities are competing for being the host, various types of lobbyism, or when a manager is being influenced by deputies. This paper argues that these problems can be analyzed as decision-making in a hierarchy using a common-agency framework. The main result is that even when the influential parties act simultaneously and the strategy sets are discrete, solutions to such decision problems as pure-strategy equilibria exist

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U

M3 - Journal article

VL - 43

SP - 35

EP - 39

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 157454