Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries

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Standard

Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries. / O’Toole, Conor M.; Tarp, Finn.

I: Journal of International Development, Bind 26, Nr. 5, 2014, s. 567-597.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

O’Toole, CM & Tarp, F 2014, 'Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries', Journal of International Development, bind 26, nr. 5, s. 567-597. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2997

APA

O’Toole, C. M., & Tarp, F. (2014). Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development, 26(5), 567-597. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2997

Vancouver

O’Toole CM, Tarp F. Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2014;26(5):567-597. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2997

Author

O’Toole, Conor M. ; Tarp, Finn. / Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries. I: Journal of International Development. 2014 ; Bind 26, Nr. 5. s. 567-597.

Bibtex

@article{e59ae5dfd6ae4305b2360f2bdcb43e86,
title = "Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries",
abstract = "This paper tests the effect of corruption on the efficiency of capital investment. Using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, covering 90 developing and transition economies, we consider whether the cost of informal bribe payments distorts the efficient allocation of capital by reducing the marginal return per unit investment. Controlling for censoring and endogeneity, we find that bribery decreases investment efficiency. The negative effect is strongest for domestic small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. We conclude that reducing the level and incidence of bribery by public officials would facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital. ",
author = "O{\textquoteright}Toole, {Conor M.} and Finn Tarp",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1002/jid.2997",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "567--597",
journal = "Journal of International Development",
issn = "0954-1748",
publisher = "JohnWiley & Sons Ltd",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries

AU - O’Toole, Conor M.

AU - Tarp, Finn

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper tests the effect of corruption on the efficiency of capital investment. Using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, covering 90 developing and transition economies, we consider whether the cost of informal bribe payments distorts the efficient allocation of capital by reducing the marginal return per unit investment. Controlling for censoring and endogeneity, we find that bribery decreases investment efficiency. The negative effect is strongest for domestic small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. We conclude that reducing the level and incidence of bribery by public officials would facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital.

AB - This paper tests the effect of corruption on the efficiency of capital investment. Using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, covering 90 developing and transition economies, we consider whether the cost of informal bribe payments distorts the efficient allocation of capital by reducing the marginal return per unit investment. Controlling for censoring and endogeneity, we find that bribery decreases investment efficiency. The negative effect is strongest for domestic small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. We conclude that reducing the level and incidence of bribery by public officials would facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital.

U2 - 10.1002/jid.2997

DO - 10.1002/jid.2997

M3 - Journal article

VL - 26

SP - 567

EP - 597

JO - Journal of International Development

JF - Journal of International Development

SN - 0954-1748

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 129825050