TY - UNPB

T1 - Competition for Migrants in a Federation

T2 - Tax or Transfer Competition?

AU - Köthenbürger, Marko

N1 - JEL Classification: H700, J200, F200

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral `migration-purchase' policies.

AB - The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral `migration-purchase' policies.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Cesifo Working Paper

BT - Competition for Migrants in a Federation

PB - Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research

CY - Munich

ER -