Commuting for meetings

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Commuting for meetings. / Fosgerau, Mogens; Engelson, Leonid; Franklin, Joel P.

I: Journal of Urban Economics, Bind 81, 05.2014, s. 104.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Fosgerau, M, Engelson, L & Franklin, JP 2014, 'Commuting for meetings', Journal of Urban Economics, bind 81, s. 104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002

APA

Fosgerau, M., Engelson, L., & Franklin, J. P. (2014). Commuting for meetings. Journal of Urban Economics, 81, 104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002

Vancouver

Fosgerau M, Engelson L, Franklin JP. Commuting for meetings. Journal of Urban Economics. 2014 maj;81:104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002

Author

Fosgerau, Mogens ; Engelson, Leonid ; Franklin, Joel P. / Commuting for meetings. I: Journal of Urban Economics. 2014 ; Bind 81. s. 104.

Bibtex

@article{a7b3c6e6607b4652827b91bb2f23d583,
title = "Commuting for meetings",
abstract = "Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability, which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We analyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not begin until both are present. Players prefer to depart later and also to arrive sooner, provided they do not have to wait for the other player. We find a unique Nash equilibrium, and a continuum of Pareto optima that are strictly better than the Nash equilibrium for both players. Pareto optima may be implemented as Nash equilibria by penalty or compensation schemes.",
keywords = "Congestion, Coordination game, Random travel time variability",
author = "Mogens Fosgerau and Leonid Engelson and Franklin, {Joel P.}",
year = "2014",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "104",
journal = "Journal of Urban Economics",
issn = "0094-1190",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Commuting for meetings

AU - Fosgerau, Mogens

AU - Engelson, Leonid

AU - Franklin, Joel P.

PY - 2014/5

Y1 - 2014/5

N2 - Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability, which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We analyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not begin until both are present. Players prefer to depart later and also to arrive sooner, provided they do not have to wait for the other player. We find a unique Nash equilibrium, and a continuum of Pareto optima that are strictly better than the Nash equilibrium for both players. Pareto optima may be implemented as Nash equilibria by penalty or compensation schemes.

AB - Urban congestion causes travel times to exhibit considerable variability, which leads to coordination problems when people have to meet. We analyze a game for the timing of a meeting between two players who must each complete a trip of random duration to reach the meeting, which does not begin until both are present. Players prefer to depart later and also to arrive sooner, provided they do not have to wait for the other player. We find a unique Nash equilibrium, and a continuum of Pareto optima that are strictly better than the Nash equilibrium for both players. Pareto optima may be implemented as Nash equilibria by penalty or compensation schemes.

KW - Congestion

KW - Coordination game

KW - Random travel time variability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84898756234&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.002

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84898756234

VL - 81

SP - 104

JO - Journal of Urban Economics

JF - Journal of Urban Economics

SN - 0094-1190

ER -

ID: 181871640