Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good : The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State. / Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

2019.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Kamei, K, Putterman, L & Tyran, J-RK 2019 'Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State'. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448470

APA

Kamei, K., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2019). Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online), Nr. 19-10 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448470

Vancouver

Kamei K, Putterman L, Tyran J-RK. Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State. 2019 sep 13. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448470

Author

Kamei, Kenju ; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good : The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State. 2019. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 19-10).

Bibtex

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title = "Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State",
abstract = "Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect” because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.",
keywords = "civic engagement, public goods provision, punishment, experiment, cooperation, C92, D02, D72, H41",
author = "Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
year = "2019",
month = "9",
day = "13",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3448470",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "19-10",
type = "WorkingPaper",

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RIS

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T1 - Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good

T2 - The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State

AU - Kamei, Kenju

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

PY - 2019/9/13

Y1 - 2019/9/13

N2 - Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect” because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

AB - Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect” because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

KW - civic engagement

KW - public goods provision

KW - punishment

KW - experiment

KW - cooperation

KW - C92

KW - D02

KW - D72

KW - H41

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3448470

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3448470

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good

ER -

ID: 241647779