Binary effectivity rules

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Standard

Binary effectivity rules. / Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel.

I: Review of Economic Design, Bind 10, Nr. 3, 2006, s. 167-181.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Keiding, H & Peleg, B 2006, 'Binary effectivity rules', Review of Economic Design, bind 10, nr. 3, s. 167-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1

APA

Keiding, H., & Peleg, B. (2006). Binary effectivity rules. Review of Economic Design, 10(3), 167-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1

Vancouver

Keiding H, Peleg B. Binary effectivity rules. Review of Economic Design. 2006;10(3):167-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1

Author

Keiding, Hans ; Peleg, Bezalel. / Binary effectivity rules. I: Review of Economic Design. 2006 ; Bind 10, Nr. 3. s. 167-181.

Bibtex

@article{aa239aa090fc11dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Binary effectivity rules",
abstract = "Abstract  A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, effectivity functions, Von Neumann–Morgenstern, game forms",
author = "Hans Keiding and Bezalel Peleg",
note = "JEL Classification: D71, C70",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "167--181",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Binary effectivity rules

AU - Keiding, Hans

AU - Peleg, Bezalel

N1 - JEL Classification: D71, C70

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Abstract  A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization

AB - Abstract  A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - effectivity functions

KW - Von Neumann–Morgenstern

KW - game forms

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1

DO - 10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

SP - 167

EP - 181

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 320704