Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes

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Standard

Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes. / Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 95, Nr. 1, 2011, s. 164–176.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Sausgruber, R & Tyran, J-R 2011, 'Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes', Journal of Public Economics, bind 95, nr. 1, s. 164–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

APA

Sausgruber, R., & Tyran, J-R. (2011). Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes. Journal of Public Economics, 95(1), 164–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

Vancouver

Sausgruber R, Tyran J-R. Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes. Journal of Public Economics. 2011;95(1):164–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

Author

Sausgruber, Rupert ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2011 ; Bind 95, Nr. 1. s. 164–176.

Bibtex

@article{47f83c8112e54b69b4aff1a7c7c93ab6,
title = "Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes",
abstract = "We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.",
keywords = "Voting",
author = "Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran",
note = "JEL classification: C92, H22, D72",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002",
language = "English",
volume = "95",
pages = "164–176",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Are we taxing ourselves?

T2 - How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes

AU - Sausgruber, Rupert

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

N1 - JEL classification: C92, H22, D72

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.

AB - We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.

KW - Voting

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 95

SP - 164

EP - 176

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 32136857