Announcements and credibility of monetary policy

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Standard

Announcements and credibility of monetary policy. / Schultz, Christian.

I: Oxford Economic Papers, Bind 48, Nr. 4, 1996, s. 673-680.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schultz, C 1996, 'Announcements and credibility of monetary policy', Oxford Economic Papers, bind 48, nr. 4, s. 673-680. <http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/48/4/673>

APA

Schultz, C. (1996). Announcements and credibility of monetary policy. Oxford Economic Papers, 48(4), 673-680. http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/48/4/673

Vancouver

Schultz C. Announcements and credibility of monetary policy. Oxford Economic Papers. 1996;48(4):673-680.

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Announcements and credibility of monetary policy. I: Oxford Economic Papers. 1996 ; Bind 48, Nr. 4. s. 673-680.

Bibtex

@article{f1cb1350ec3211dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Announcements and credibility of monetary policy",
abstract = "An infinitely repeated monetary policy game {\`a} la Barro and Gordon is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game",
author = "Christian Schultz",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "673--680",
journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
issn = "0030-7653",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Announcements and credibility of monetary policy

AU - Schultz, Christian

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game

AB - An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game

M3 - Journal article

VL - 48

SP - 673

EP - 680

JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

SN - 0030-7653

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 3046178