TY - JOUR

T1 - Alternative health insurance schemes

T2 - a welfare comparison

AU - Keiding, Hans

AU - Hansen, Bodil O.

N1 - JEL Classification: I19, G22

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives

AB - In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives

U2 - 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00062-0

DO - 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00062-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 739

EP - 756

JO - Journal of Health Economics

JF - Journal of Health Economics

SN - 0167-6296

IS - 5

ER -