Allocating multiple units

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Standard

Allocating multiple units. / Tranæs, Torben; Krishna, Kala.

I: Economic Theory, Bind 20, Nr. 4, 2002, s. 733-750.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Tranæs, T & Krishna, K 2002, 'Allocating multiple units', Economic Theory, bind 20, nr. 4, s. 733-750. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

APA

Tranæs, T., & Krishna, K. (2002). Allocating multiple units. Economic Theory, 20(4), 733-750. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

Vancouver

Tranæs T, Krishna K. Allocating multiple units. Economic Theory. 2002;20(4):733-750. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

Author

Tranæs, Torben ; Krishna, Kala. / Allocating multiple units. I: Economic Theory. 2002 ; Bind 20, Nr. 4. s. 733-750.

Bibtex

@article{3cf4d82074c511dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Allocating multiple units",
abstract = "This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points",
author = "Torben Tran{\ae}s and Kala Krishna",
note = "JEL Classification: D44",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "733--750",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Allocating multiple units

AU - Tranæs, Torben

AU - Krishna, Kala

N1 - JEL Classification: D44

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points

AB - This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

DO - 10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 733

EP - 750

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 127706