Thomas Rasmusen Tørsløv forsvarer sin ph.d.-afhandling

Thomas Rasmusen Tørsløv forsvarer sin ph.d.-afhandling: "International Corporate Taxation - the result of trying to curb strong economic incentives with unclear rules"


Thomas Rasmusen Tørsløv


"International Corporate Taxation - The result of trying to curb strong economic incentives with unclear rules". Det vil være muligt før forsvaret at rekvirere en kopi af afhandlingen ved henvendelse til Informationen (26.0.20), Økonomisk Institut.

Tid og sted

16. maj 2019 kl. 15:45, CSS, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 København K, bygning 26, lokale 26.2.21. Af hensyn til kandidaten lukkes dørene præcis.


Professor Peter Birch Sørensen, Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet, Danmark (formand)
Professor Annette Alstadsæter, Handelshøyskolen, Norge
Professor Ronald Davies, University College Dublin, Irland


The dissertation revolves around the topic of tax avoidance by multinational corporations. It consists of three self-contained chapters:  

In the first chapter my co-authors and I investigate whether countries at a lower state of development experience a higher exposure to profit shifting by MNCs. In doing so we provide a new framework for estimating profit shifting: Estimating the change in propensity for MNCs to report zero profits following a change in tax incentives.

In the second chapter we try to answer the question: "What amount of profits are shifted to tax havens worldwide?". To answer this, we exploit new macroeconomic data known as foreign affiliates statistics. We show that foreign firms are an order of magnitude more profitable than local firms in tax havens, but less profitable than local firms in other countries. Leveraging this differential profitability, we estimate the amount of multinational profits that are shifted to tax havens globally each year . 

In the third chapter, we zoom out and look at the effect profit shifting has on the effective tax rates paid by MNCs. By systematically decomposing the effective tax rates of U.S.- and EU-based MNCs, we show that profit shifting can only explain at most a quarter of the fall in effective tax rates paid since 2004. The remainder is explained by falling statutory and effective tax rates across the globe. These results are consistent with international tax competition.