Frederik Plum Hauschultz forsvarer sin ph.d.-afhandling ved Økonomisk Institut

Kandidat: Frederik Plum Hauschultz

Titel: "Learning, Search, and Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets". Det vil være muligt før forsvaret at rekvirere en kopi af afhandlingen ved henvendelse til Receptionen (26.0.20), Økonomisk Institut.

Tid og sted
30. oktober 2019 kl. 14:00, Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet, CSS, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 København K, bygning 26, lokale 26.2.21 (Det Store Seminarrum, 2. sal). Af hensyn til kandidaten lukkes dørene præcis.

Bedømmelsesudvalg
Lektor Nick Vikander, Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet (formand)
Associate professor Mitsuru Igami, Department of Economics, Yale University, USA 
Professor Pierre Dubois, Toulouse School of Economics, Frankrig

Abstract
This PhD dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that all study separate aspects of supply and demand in the market for pharmaceutical products. The first chapter focuses on the role of past consumption experiences in shaping patients’ purchase decisions. In the chapter I estimate a dynamic structural model of consumer learning which explains key patterns in the data, in particular the fact that patients’ propensity to switch treatment and quit treatment decreases sharply at every pharmacy visit.

The second chapter, which is written together with Anders Munk-Nielsen, studies price cycles in the Danish pharmaceutical markets. The price cycles are signified by large and sudden price increases followed by slow and gradual downward price movements that can take years to come back. We use transaction data to estimate a demand curve in these markets, and solve a dynamic Bertrand competition model that incorporate our estimated demand curve, and is able to produce these price patterns.  

The third chapter, which is written together with Anders Munk-Nielsen, studies pricing equilibria when consumers search sequentially for products. We use the fact that physicians who write prescriptions in Denmark choose brands from an alphabetically ordered drop-down list, which gives a strategic advantage to being ranked first. We show that firms respond to this advantage in their pricing, but in a surprising way. In small markets, the highest ranked firm charges the highest price, but in larger markets, high ranked firms charge lower prices. We solve a stylized model and show that it can reproduce this flip in the price rank gradient.