Frederik Plesner Lyngse forsvarer sin ph.d.-afhandling ved Økonomisk Institut


Kandidat

Frederik Plesner Lyngse

Titel

"Essays in Health Economics: Supply and Demand".

Det vil være muligt før forsvaret at rekvirere en kopi af afhandlingen ved henvendelse til Charlotte.Jespersen@econ.ku.dk


Tid og sted

16. april 2020 kl. 13:00. Link til at logge på overværelse af forsvaret følger her: https://ucph-ku.zoom.us/j/9536476672

Bedømmelsesudvalg

  • Lektor Mette Gørtz, Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet, Danmark (formand)
  • Professor Petter Lundborg, Lund Universitet
  • Lektor Fane Naja Groes, CBS

Abstract

This thesis comprises three self-contained chapters. While the chapters are somewhat different, they all share some common denominators. First, they all address supply or demand in the healthcare sector. Second, they all exploit unique data sources. Third, they all address inequality and are relevant for policy.

In Chapter 1: “How Does Payday Affect Prescription Drug Purchases? Evidence from Danish Welfare Benefit Recipients”, I show that individuals on welfare benefits are liquidity constrained by the end of the month to a degree that they postpone purchasing prescription drugs and thereby delaying treatment that should not be delayed. I find clear evidence of purchasing sensitivity around transfer income payday and show that liquidity constraints is a key operating mechanism for why individuals living off welfare benefits postpone filling antibiotic prescriptions. These results indicate that out-of-pocket costs for medical treatment leads to inequality in access to timely treatment across socio economic groups

In Chapter 2: “Collusion among Specialist Physicians: Evidence from Narrative and Administrative Data”, I exploit a policy change that introduced cost-control incentives in provider contracts for independent physician clinics providing services to public patients in Denmark that introduced incentives for collusion among the physician clinics. I document the internal organization of a trade industry organization colluding by dividing the market according to firm-specific quotas. They enforce the quotas by sending out e-mails calling for a production reduction in order to keep public reimbursement fees as high as possible. I show that physicians respond to these e-mails by decreasing production of public patients — both in revenue and number of patients treated. I further demonstrate spillovers in the form of increased treatment of private patients fully offsetting the production decrease of public patients.

In Chapter 3: “Early Labor Market Circumstances and Gender Gaps in Life Time Career Opportunities”, written together with Torben Heien Nielsen and Itzik Fadlon, we investigate how early career circumstances determine long run labor market opportunities differentially for males and females. To do so, we exploit a lottery affecting the first job for physicians just graduated from medical school. We show that initial unluck in the labor market affects women negatively in their long run career opportunities, while men are unaffected. In particular, we find that unlucky women are less likely to invest in additional human capital and more likely to reside in a rural area. Further, we investigate three mechanisms potentially influencing these results. These results imply that males and females respond to adverse circumstances early in the career differentially, implying an inequality across the two sexes.