Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword

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Cost incentives for doctors : A double-edged sword. / Schottmüller, Christoph.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 61, 07.2013, s. 43-58.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schottmüller, C 2013, 'Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword', European Economic Review, bind 61, s. 43-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001

APA

Schottmüller, C. (2013). Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword. European Economic Review, 61, 43-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001

Vancouver

Schottmüller C. Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword. European Economic Review. 2013 jul.;61:43-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001

Author

Schottmüller, Christoph. / Cost incentives for doctors : A double-edged sword. I: European Economic Review. 2013 ; Bind 61. s. 43-58.

Bibtex

@article{70f30784254e434ab28ecd16b6c3fa40,
title = "Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword",
abstract = "If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.",
author = "Christoph Schottm{\"u}ller",
note = "JEL classification: D82; D83; I10",
year = "2013",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001",
language = "English",
volume = "61",
pages = "43--58",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Cost incentives for doctors

T2 - A double-edged sword

AU - Schottmüller, Christoph

N1 - JEL classification: D82; D83; I10

PY - 2013/7

Y1 - 2013/7

N2 - If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.

AB - If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

SP - 43

EP - 58

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

ER -

ID: 45102311