Announcements and credibility of monetary policy
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Oxford Economic Papers |
Vol/bind | 48 |
Udgave nummer | 4 |
Sider (fra-til) | 673-680 |
ISSN | 0030-7653 |
Status | Udgivet - 1996 |
ID: 3046178