Information, polarization and term length in democracy
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Information, polarization and term length in democracy. / Schultz, Christian.
I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 92, Nr. 5-6, 2008, s. 1078-1091.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Information, polarization and term length in democracy
AU - Schultz, Christian
N1 - JEL classification: D72, H1, H7, K4
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.
AB - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008
M3 - Journal article
VL - 92
SP - 1078
EP - 1091
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
IS - 5-6
ER -
ID: 3798074