Development Economics Research Group (DERG)

INTRODUCTION

Finn Tarp
Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Copenhagen (UCPH)
Who We are and What We do?

• Founded in **1996**, DERG is a group of development economists based at the Department of Economics—sometimes out-posted in developing countries or international organisations (ex. WIDER)

• DERG includes **25 staff** at all academic levels from research assistants to professors

• DERG is **coordinated by** Finn Tarp, John Rand and Henrik Hansen

• DERG members **teach and train, and engage** in research, policy and practice in development economics in Denmark and partner countries (+ public debate)

• DERG depends on **external funding** for our activities
Research, Policy and Practice

• We work at the nexus of research, policy and practice and strive to stimulate ideas, subjecting them to in-depth analysis, generating evidence, mobilizing action and building capacity.

• We contribute to the strategy of the University of Copenhagen (UCPH) in the shared search for solutions to complex global challenges as articulated in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved by the UN General Assembly in September 2015.
Teaching and Training

DERG staff are responsible for a range of regular BSc and MSc courses in Economics at the Department of Economics:

**BSc level**

- Development economics

**MSc level**

- Advanced development economics – Macro aspects
- Advanced development economics – Micro aspects

To this comes supervision of Bachelor and Master’s theses as well as PhD supervision and the running of regular economic seminar series.

Importantly, DERG staff support the Faculty of Social Sciences MSc in Global Development
Country/Long Term Partnerships
Current Research Projects

- **ETHIOPIA**
  - Building Resilience to Climate Change in Ethiopia: Exploring Options for Action

- **MYANMAR**
  - Towards Inclusive Development in Myanmar

- ** MOZAMBIQUE**
  - Economic Development and Institutions (EDI) - Mozambique Institutional Diagnostic Tool
  - Inclusive Growth in Mozambique - Scaling-Up Research and Capacity

- **SOUTHERN AFRICA**
  - Southern Africa - Towards Inclusive Economic Development (SA-TIED)

- **TANZANIA**
  - Tanzania - Growth and Development Research Project (GDRP)

- **VIETNAM**
  - DERG Research in Vietnam
A decent life is a fundamental human right.

At DERG we promote quality research, leading to robust and sustainable development policy to end poverty in all its forms. Everywhere!
Stockholm Statement

Towards a new consensus on the principles of policy-making for the contemporary world

Finn Tarp
Department of Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Copenhagen (UCPH)
Development Economics: 1945 to mid-1970s

- World War II
- World Bank + IMF
- Foreign aid (multi + bilateral)
- Regional development banks
- Market failure and focus on the state
- Import substitution + industrial policy
- Neoclassical counter-revolution/market fundamentalism
- International debt crisis and economic collapse
The Washington Consensus (WC) (John Williamson)

Ten broad sets of relatively specific policy recommendations:

1. **Fiscal policy** discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to GDP;

2. Redirection of public spending from subsidies ("especially indiscriminate subsidies") toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment;

3. **Tax reform**, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;

4. **Interest rates** that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;

5. Competitive **exchange rates**;

6. **Trade liberalization**: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;

7. Liberalization of inward **foreign direct investment**;

8. **Privatization** of state enterprises;

9. **Deregulation**: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions;

10. Legal security for **property rights**.
1980s: A Lost Decade for Development (sub-Saharan Africa average annual change in pct 1980-89)

- **GDP per capita**: -1.1
- **Gross domestic investment**: -3.9
- **Merchandise exports**: -0.6
- **Merchandise imports**: -5.9
- **Inflation**: 19.0
- **Terms of trade**: -4.9
- **Long term debt outstanding**: 14.5
- **Population growth**: 3.2
- **Plus debt service (percent of GNP)**: 1.4 (1965), 3.1 (1980), 5.9 (1989)
Post Washington Consensus Developments

• What happened?

• Adjustment with a human face
• Increasing focus on poverty and inequality
• Gradual paradigm shifting
• World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995) -> MDGs
• Debt relief
World Bank

- Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz (1997-2000)
- Prof Kaushik Basu (2012-16)
- Council of Eminent Persons (CEP)
- A. Sen, J. Stiglitz, other former Chief Economists, Eric Maskin, Esther Duflo, Montek Ahluwalia and a handful more
- World Development Reports
- What to do about the WC? Jim Yong Kim!
- And what about the SDGs?
Saltsjöbaden

- **Thirteen economists**, which included four former Chief Economists of the World Bank, met over two days at Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, on 16-17 September 2016, to discuss the challenges faced by today’s **economic policy makers**

- The meeting was hosted by the Swedish International Development Agency **SIDA** and the **World Bank**
The Group

• Sabina Alkire (Oxford)
• Pranab Bardhan (Berkeley)
• Kaushik Basu (New York)
• Haroon Bhorat (Cape Town)
• Francois Bourguignon (Paris)
• Ashwini Deshpande (Delhi)
• Ravi Kanbur (Ithaca)

• Justin Yifu Lin (Beijing)
• Kalle Moene (Oslo)
• Jean-Philippe Platteau (Namur)
• Jaime Saavedra (Lima)
• Joseph Stiglitz (New York)
• Finn Tarp (Helsinki and Copenhagen)
8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

The challenge of development

It is now evident that some of the recommendations of more traditional economics were not valid. Policy makers cannot rely on simple policy guides such as holding the fiscal balance in check, using monetary policy to control inflation, providing macroeconomic stability, and then leaving it to the market to do the rest.

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8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

1. **GDP growth is not an end in itself**

While policies to promote GDP growth are needed, that must not be an end in itself but a means to creating the resources needed to achieve a range of societal objectives, which include improved health, education, employment, security, as well as consumption.

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8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

2 Development has to be inclusive

Policy should help ensure that development is socially and economically inclusive, and does not leave behind groups of the population — whether identified by gender, ethnicity, or other social indicators.

#StockholmStatement
8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

3 Environmental sustainability is a requirement, not an option

Development policy-making must take on environmental sustainability as a central objective.

#StockholmStatement
4 The need to balance market, state, and community

Development policy has to build on a judicious balance among market, state, and community. It is important to recognize that markets are themselves social institutions which need a framework of efficient regulation to deliver on their promise of efficient economic allocation of resources.

#StockholmStatement
8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

5 Providing macroeconomic stability

Economies with greater stability succeed in having greater growth, with further enhancement of wellbeing. Macroeconomic stability entails managing policies to keep the economy on an even keel and paying attention to longer-term implications of today’s policy actions, notably ensuring fiscal and external financial sustainability.

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8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

6 Attending to the impact of global technology and inequality

Automation, the rise in robotics and the globalization of the labour market not only displaces labour, it replaces the earnings of workers with higher profits for corporations and the owners of machines. These consequences are a concern that must be addressed without converting this into a global labour-versus-labour tussle.

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8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

7 Social norms and mindsets matter

Our values and culture are not just important in themselves, they also affect how an economy performs. A society in which people have trust in one another does better than one in which people do not.

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8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

8 The responsibility of the international community

Global forces increasingly frame the development policy options open to national governments. They present constraints and opportunities and are themselves, in turn, determined by actions in other countries.

#StockholmStatement
8 PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING

Looking forward

If countries follow pragmatic policies of balancing market, state, and community in addressing development challenges, and if the international community works together to relieve the constraints of global forces and take advantage of the new opportunities being afforded, the technological progress the world is experiencing can be translated into progress in wellbeing for all, including the most deprived.

#StockholmStatement
Conclusions

- **Traditional economic thinking** no longer applies
- **Inequality** within countries is threatening social cohesion and economic progress
- **Development** needs to be seen in a broader perspective in order to achieve more equitable and **sustainable** results
- **Trickle down alone** will not do the trick
Outreach

• Stockholm Statement translated into **22 languages**, including African languages such as Amharic and Kiswahili

• Since the release of the Stockholm Statement in late 2016, many different **media outlets** around the world have reported on the principles
Økonomisk udvikling og god regeringsførelse

Thomas Markussen
DERG
Worldwide Governance Indicators

2018, Control of Corruption

Percentile Range
- 0-10th
- 10-25th
- 25-50th
- 50-75th
- 75-90th
- 90-100th
- over 100

Country
- Afghanistan
- Albania
- Algeria
- American Samoa
- Andorra
- Angola
- Anguilla
- Antigua and Barbuda
- Argentina
- Armenia
- Aruba
- Australia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Bahamas, The
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Barbados
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Belize
Institutioner og udvikling – mikro- og makroniveau

• Analyser på makroniveau: giver overblik, men svært at udlede kausalsammenhænge og policy implikationer
⇒ Behov for analyser på mikroniveau

Eksempel:
Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS)
• Effekter af “politiske forbindelser” på investering, ejendomsrettigheder, indkomst og adgang til lån
VARHS

North West

North East

Red River Delta

North Central Coast

Central Highland

South Central Coast

South East

Mekong River Delta
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has no party members</th>
<th>Income per capita, '000 VND (median)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2008 and 2016</td>
<td>25,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2016, <em>not</em> in 2008 (&quot;joiner&quot;)</td>
<td>15,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2008, <em>not</em> in 2016 (&quot;leaver&quot;)</td>
<td>18,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Markussen and Ngo 2019, *World Development*
Politiske forbindelser og investering

Table 3
Investment and connections to officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable: ln(total investment + 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative with public office</td>
<td>0.588&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of head</td>
<td>0.056&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of head, squared</td>
<td>−0.001&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of general education of head</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>−0.494&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Markussen and Tarp 2014, *Journal of Development Economics*
Konklusion

• Detaljerede mikroanalyser af regeringsførelse kan:
  • Vise skævheder i allokering af økonomiske ressourcer
  • Sætte regeringsførelse på dagsordenen
  • Indikere hvordan institutioner kan forbedres
# Medlemskab af Kommunistpartiet og indkomst

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party membership, income and occupation.</th>
<th>Income per capita, ’000 VND (median)</th>
<th>Has member working for government or SOE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has no party members</td>
<td>10,204</td>
<td>20,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2008 and 2016</td>
<td>25,631</td>
<td>34,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2016, not in 2008 (“joiner”)</td>
<td>15,543</td>
<td>27,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has party member in 2008, not in 2016 (“leaver”)</td>
<td>18,446</td>
<td>25,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Markussen and Ngo 2019, *World Development*
Table 5
Determinants of household income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per capita hh income, log</th>
<th>Per capita luxury food consumption, ln(x + 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party member in hh</td>
<td>0.306*** (0.031)</td>
<td>0.102*** (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female hh head</td>
<td>0.045** (0.023)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of hh head</td>
<td>0.025*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of hh head squared/1000</td>
<td>-0.208*** (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.104* (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling, mean among working age adults</td>
<td>0.064*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.025*** (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinh</td>
<td>0.355*** (0.038)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government or SOE worker in hh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.169*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.093*** (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.135*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.195*** (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leavers excluded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12,139</td>
<td>12,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models 1 and 2 are random effects, models 3–6 are fixed effects models. Standard errors, adjusted for commune level clustering, in parentheses. Model 5 excludes households who lose a party member during the survey period. Data for 2008–2016 used. " p < 0.1; "" p < 0.05; "*** p < 0.01. Level of analysis: Household.
Strukturel transformation 2.0 (eller 3.0 eller 4.0)

John Rand
Økonomisk Eksploratorium #5 om udviklingsøkonomi
København 24. oktober 2019
Hvorfor er det interessant?

- **Beliggenheden** og **strukturen** på den globale industriproduktion har ændret sig markant i det nye årtusinde.
- Forarbejdede produkter produceres nu i højere grad i **udviklingslande**, og har afstedkommet et meget mere komplekst globalt værdikæde system (**Global Value Chains**)
- Tre ting har muliggjort denne strukturelle omlægning:
  - Faldende transport and kommunikations omkostninger
  - Afhængighed af **mindre sofistikerede** og dermed lettere adgang til inputs
  - Afhængighed af produktionsprocesser som i højere grad end tidligere kan udnytte **"economies of scale"** og som har **agglomerationsfordele**.
- Men skiftet har ikke været ligeligt fordelt
  - Østasien står i dag for mere 60% af værditilvæksten genereret af udviklingslande.
- Den "afrikanske" industriproduktion og deres andel af den totale eksport er faldet både i volumen og i diversitet and kompleksitet.
  - Netværks teorier (Hausmann and Hidalgo, Science 2007) forudsiger at dette har, og vil få, meget store udviklingsmæssige konsekvenser for Afrika på længere sigt, da der ligger meget læring i denne form for omlægning – det jeg kalder **"strukturel transformation 2.0 (eller 3.0 eller 4.0)"**.
Hvad er det der sker i Afrika?

- Afrika har generelt haft svært ved at industrialisere og der har været meget lidt jobskabelse i forarbejdningssektoren.
  - Arbejdskraft er endda flyttet fra højere til lavere value added produktion (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011).
  - Den gennemsnitlige industriproduktion i Afrika’s fattigste lande er lavere i dag (som andel af BNP) end det var i 1985 (Page, 2012).

- En form for strukturel ændring som skifter knappe ressourcer fra lav til høj produktive formal er presserende i Afrika (Newman mfl., 2018)
  - Spørgsmålet er om vækst kan skabes uden en strukturel omlægning?

- Kan (og skal) Afrika industrialisere?
  - Hvad kanaccelerere skiftet af arbejdskraft fra lav produktive jobs I landbrug og den uformelle sektor, til mere produktive jobs i agro-business, forarbejdning og handlede services?
Meget har ændret sig – SMIL 😊

Men der er meget læring i forarbejdning (produktion). Men hvilken type produktion er bedst i hvilken kontekst? Kan vi identificere det?
Økonomisk Kompleksitet “Du er hvad du eksporterer” 😊

- Bygger på ideen om at det betyder noget hvad du eksporterer.
  - Positiv sammenhæng mellem hvor sofistikeret din eksport er og økonomisk vækst.

- Der er positive “kontekst specifikke eksternaliteter” i hvert produceret produkt, som giver mulighed for forskellige lærings “spillovers”.

- Lande kan derfor strategisk leapfroge og opnå vækst hurtigere ved at diversificere og opgradere til mere sofistikerede produkter (selvom man ikke umiddelbart har en komparativ fordel heri).

- Komparative fordele kan skabes/udvikles. ”Technological capabilities can be acquired and can change what you export. There is no need to rely only on your natural endowments to guide export patterns” Hausmann and Hidalgo (2007).

- POLITIK ANBEFALING: Fokuser også i højere kvalitets/produktivitetsprodukter - og ikke kun i produkter hvor du har komparative fordele.

Hvordan er et land komplekst?

Kilde: Atlas of Economic Complexity
Ghana

Thailand

70erne

90erne

NU
Hvad kan man tage med fra teorien om Økonomisk Kompleksitet?

- **Specialisering** i få produkter er nok en dårlig ide.

- **Industripolitik** bliver lige pludselig et meget vigtigt værktøj indenfor udviklingsøkonomi.

- **At udpege vindere “picking winners”** er måske mindre vanskeligt end først antaget.

- **Handelspolitik** i rige (mere sofistikerede) lande bliver fundamental for spørgsmål relateret til global ulighed.

- Og det hele starter med ideen omkring **vigtigheden af eksternaliteter/spillover effekter i læring** (mellem produkter, mellem mennesker etc.)

- Og dette arbejder jeg på at forstå bedre i en udviklingskontekst med brug af mikro data (census matched employer-employee data – svarende til at matche alle data fra det danske CVR and CPR register).
The abandonment of violence against women: Experimental evidence from Tanzania

Pablo Selaya

Økonomisk Eksploratorium
24. oktober 2019
Violence against women

143

ing violence and prevailing social norms in different contexts. Finally, data on violence against women from other sources for selected countries, including those based on victimization surveys, are presented (alphabetically) in dedicated tables.

1. Violence against women by all perpetrators

Physical violence against women

Physical violence consists of acts aimed at physically hurting the victim and include, but are not limited to, pushing, grabbing, twisting the arm, pulling the hair, slapping, kicking, biting or hitting with the fist or object, trying to strangle or suffocate, burning or scalding on purpose, or attacking with some sort of weapon, gun or knife. The proportion of women who experienced physical violence (regardless of the perpetrator) at least once in their lifetime and in the last 12 months is presented in figure 6.2 and table 6.1.

For countries with available DHS data (figure 6.1), the proportion of women experiencing physical violence in their lifetime ranged from 13 per cent in Azerbaijan (2006) to 64 per cent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007). For physical violence experienced in the 12 months prior to the survey, prevalence ranged from 6 per cent in the Comoros (2012) to 56 per cent in Equatorial Guinea (2011).

Based on available data, reported prevalence of physical violence was highest in Africa, with almost half of countries reporting lifetime prevalence of over 40 per cent. The range of prevalence was widest in Africa, from 14 per cent in Comoros (2012) to 64 per cent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007). The range of lifetime physical violence in Asia was narrower, from 13 per cent in Azerbaijan (2006) to almost 40 per cent in Timor-Leste (2009–10). Data availability is higher in Africa than in other regions.

Among countries for which comparable data are available for multiple years, a number of them showed encouraging declines in the prevalence of physical violence experienced in the past 12 months, including Cameroon (from 45 per cent in 2004 to 27 per cent in 2011) and Uganda (from 34 per cent in 2006 to 27 per cent in 2011). However, results for the majority of countries revealed that the prevalence of violence stayed almost constant, reflecting the persistence of the problem (see Statistical Annex).18

The 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) provides up-to-date information on the population and health situation in Tanzania. The 2010 TDHS is the fifth national Demographic and Health Survey conducted in the country.

In the 2010 TDHS, more than 7,000 women age 15-49 were asked about their experiences of violence and female genital cutting (FGC).

**Experience of Physical Violence in the Past 12 months (All Women)**

Percent of all women 15-49 who have experienced physical violence in the past 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kagera</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singida</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manyara</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba N.5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba S.7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unguja N.8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unguja S.15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town West 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-third of Tanzanian women age 15-49 have experienced physical violence in the past 12 months.

**Almost 2 in 5 women in Tanzania have ever experienced physical violence since age 15.** Most of these women who have experienced physical violence report that a husband, partner, or boyfriend committed the violence.

44% of ever-married women have experienced physical or sexual violence by their current/most recent husband/partner, and 37% of ever-married women experienced such spousal violence in the past 12 months.

44% of ever-married women age 15-49 believe that a husband is justified in beating his wife for certain reasons. Acceptability of wife beating is higher among women than men for all of the reasons noted above.

20% of women have ever experienced sexual violence, usually perpetrated by their partners or former partners.

One in ten Tanzanian women who have ever had sex report that their first sex was forced against their will.

**Degree of Marital Control Exercised by Husbands**

Percent of ever-married women age 15-49 whose husband/partner displays specific types of controlling behaviours

- Is jealous or angry if she talks to other men: 66%
- Frequently accuses her of being unfaithful: 32%
- Does not permit her to meet her female friends: 20%
- Tries to limit her contact with her family: 18%
- Insists on knowing where she is at all times: 49%
- Does not trust her with any money: 16%
- Displays 3 or more of the specific behaviours: 35%
- Displays none of the specific behaviours: 23%

35% of ever-married women report that their husband/partner displays 3 or more controlling behaviours.
Violence against women in Tanzania

Ongoing research aimed at understanding:

- its causes
- the mechanisms that sustain this harmful maladaptation
- policies to abandon it
Documentary films on violence against women

In 2009, the Tanzanian Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children produced and broadcasted a documentary film showing severe cases of violence against:

- women
- albinos
- children

Did it work?
Documentary films

Non-fictional motion pictures "intended to document reality, primarily for the purposes of instruction, education, or maintaining a historical record."

Documentary films on violence against women:

- **information**: data, statistics, legal frames
- **emotional content**: increase awareness, sensitivity, solidarity

To inform and sensitize individuals and society:

1. deter perpetrators
2. encourage victims and survivors to resist and denounce
Documentary films on violence against women

Dox may work. Or not:

- may not be sufficiently convincing to perpetrators
- speaking up and about is difficult for victims and survivors

May even be harmful themselves:

- Harm to stop harm
- TV content rating systems: "Images not apt for all audiences"
26/06/2019

BATTERED WOMEN'S SUPPORT SERVICES PRESENTS

“MAN UP.”

He shouldn’t have to act so tough, but he does. He’s constantly being told to man up. “Manning up” is a crisis in masculinity that causes violence against women and girls.

June: International call to all men to end violence against women. We’re helping men own their role. The violence stops here.

#STOP THE VIOLENCE

My strength is not for hurting.

So when she changed her mind, I stopped.

Men can stop rape.

So when she was drunk, I backed off.

Men can stop rape.
Rygning er årsag til slagtilfælde og handicap

Rygstoplinion: 80 31 31 31
www.stoplinien.dk
La letra entra con sangre (Goya 1785)
Effects of dox on violence against women

We did a Randomized Control Trial (RCT):

- **Experimental treatment**: dox on violence against women

- **Placebo**: dox on violence against albino: exploit info content, isolate violent images

- **Control**: no dox

*Sample*: 480 participants

(40 W + 40 M in 6 villages by Bagamoyo and Mwanza)
Outcomes

1. Reporting of violence against women (women)

2. Justification of violence against women (women and men)
Do dox affect violence reporting and attitudes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Any violence</th>
<th>(2) Violence index</th>
<th>(3) Any violence is justified</th>
<th>(4) Violence justification index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 1 vs. No</td>
<td>-0.20**</td>
<td>-0.90**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 2 vs. No</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 1 vs.</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 2</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 1 vs. No</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 2 vs. No</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 1 vs.</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video 2</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results

1. **Women report less** after seeing the documentary film

2. No effect on justification among women

3. **Men justify less** – detected also with albino dox
Violence against women is a maladaptation (Edgerton 1992).

It is pervasive and persistent: associated with socio-economic and institutional limitations, but supported by *social norms* that become part of our *culture*.

How to promote cultural change against harmful practices?

A common tool – dox – has a mixture of effects (similar to visual cues in tobacco packs).

Films work but they have to be re-designed to avoid the negative unintended consequences of dox (Vogt 2016, La Ferrara et al 2019).
Effekten af tropiske storme: Tyfonen Damrey i Vietnam, 2005

Le Dang Trung og Henrik Hansen

- Vi estimerer effekterne af tyfonen Damrey på husholdninger i Vietnam.
- Vi formoder, at husholdninger lærer at tilpasse sig til tropiske storme, og vi vælger derfor en sammenligningsgruppe i upåvirke kommuner ved at matche den historiske hyppighed af tropiske storme.
- Vi finder, at ris produktionen blev hårdt ramt, mens vi ikke finder signifikante effekter på husholdningernes samlede indkomst.
- Damrey beskadigede også huse og tvang husholdningerne til at øge reparationsudgifter.
- Låntagning var en vigtig finansieringsmekanisme, mens familieoverførsler (remitter) ikke steg.

En vindhastighedsmodel kan identificere de berørte områder i Vietnam, selv om vi ikke var på stederne i 2005.

Men Vietnam har været ramt af 250 store storme de seneste 50 år, så man skal tænke sig godt om når man vil evaluere effekten af Damrey.

Vi sammenligner husholdninger i kommuner som blev ramt af Damrey med husholdninger i kommuner som ikke blev ramt, men som ligner de kommuner, der blev ramt...

Vi ser på ændringer fra 2004 til 2006 i ris produktion, indkomst, fødevareforbrug og reparationsudgifter...

...dette er effekten af Damrey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>År</th>
<th>Ramt af Damrey</th>
<th>Ikke ramt</th>
<th>Forskel i ændring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pr(\(S_c > 0\)) = 1 - e^{-\lambda}

Samtidig er der noget interessant med husholdningernes lån. Lån afhænger nemlig af i hvor høj grad husholdningerne er vant til storme.

Det er interessant at overførslerne ikke stiger. Andre studier finder nemlig at de stiger efter naturkatastrofer. Vi mener, vores resultat skyldes at en storm (næsten) som Damrey kunne forventes i områderne.

Vi ser også på hvor de fik penge fra: Remitter (penge fra familieledemmer andre steder i landet/udlandet) eller nye lån...

...dette er reaktionen på Damrey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DID</td>
<td>Std. afv.</td>
<td>DID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andel med overførsler</td>
<td>0.009 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andel med nye lån</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.055)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overførsler (millioner VND)</td>
<td>0.779 (0.556)</td>
<td>0.126 (0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lån (millioner VND)</td>
<td>-0.973 (0.907)</td>
<td>8.721** (3.928)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vi bruger den estimerede sandsynlighed for at blive ramt af en storm til at udvælge sammenlignings-kommuner i Vietnam.

Vi sammenligner husholdninger i kommuner som blev ramt af Damrey med husholdninger i kommuner som ikke blev ramt, men som ligner de kommuner, der blev ramt...

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...dette er effekten af Damrey.

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An empirical analysis of state fragility and growth: the impact of state ineffectiveness and political violence

Ines A. Ferreira,
Postgraduate researcher, School of International Development, UEA

CONTEXT

• The role of the state in promoting development has been discussed at length. Despite the variety of perspectives, existing studies agree in some common characteristics of the state that are favourable to promoting development.
• However, as a result of the events over the last decades, increasing attention has been brought to the implications that a failure of the state to fulfil these features bears on development, which became the core of the discourse on fragile states. Despite the mounting number of existing analytical tools, the concept of state fragility remains obscure and the quantification efforts do not fall short of criticism.

CONCEPT OF STATE FRAGILITY

There is state fragility when the country exhibits either state ineffectiveness or political violence, or both pathologies at the same time. The higher their level, the greater the degree of fragility.

MEASURE OF STATE FRAGILITY

Principal components analysis provided a score on state ineffectiveness for 158 countries, and on political violence for 166 countries for period 1993-2012.

METHODS AND DATA

• Econometric methods (OLS; IV) were used to estimate a standard growth regression to which a single index of state fragility was added.
• On a second stage, this index was replaced by two indices, one for state ineffectiveness and another for political violence.
• Finally, an interaction term between the two symptoms was added, in order to test whether they have an interactive effect on growth.
• The control variables follow the general practice in the literature.

KEY FINDINGS

• There is a negative and significant effect of state ineffectiveness on growth, which is robust to: excluding outliers, adding new controls, including a measure of the quality of institutions, and taking endogeneity into account by using IV methods with different instrumentation strategies.
• The sign and significance level of the coefficient for political violence vary across specifications.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

• The results of regression analysis show no robust effect of fragility on growth when a single index is considered.
• When using two separate indices, one finds a robust negative and significant impact of state ineffectiveness. However, the non-significant effect of political violence indicates that the complex link with growth needs further investigation.
• This contributes to a better understanding of the role of governance in promoting growth, but also suggests the way forward. Namely, it concurs to the argument that, in order to unpack the complexity of state fragility and its effects, one should consider its different dimensions.

Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. State fragility (v1) is the first principal component obtained from applying PCA to the two indices. State fragility (v2) is the first principal component obtained from applying PCA to all the dimensions used in the two indices. State fragility index and its components are not included in the panel analysis.
Can we help young workers find better jobs?
Running experiments to understand what works

Paolo Falco
www.paolofalco.com

- Young workers in the developing world struggle to find good jobs
- Available work is often informal, insecure, and badly paid

WHAT CAN WE DO TO MAKE THEIR JOB SEARCH MORE EFFECTIVE?

- MONEY TO SEARCH
  (A TRANSPORT SUBSIDY)
- CLEARER CREDENTIALS
  (CERTIFICATES, IMPROVED CVs, ETC.)

WE EVALUATED THE EFFECTS OF THESE INTERVENTIONS BY RUNNING AN EXPERIMENT

RESULTS

✓ Both programmes have positive short-term effects
✓ In the long run, giving workers clearer credentials improves their prospects
✓ The interventions are considerably cheaper than alternative policies

Building Resilience to Climate Change in Ethiopia: Exploring Options for Action

About

Collaborative research project between Development Economics Group (DERG) of Copenhagen University and Policy Studies Institute (PSI), Ethiopia

Project Life: Runs for five years, starting April 1, 2019 – ending March 31, 2024

Source of Funding: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Overall aim:

To identify, evaluate and compare drivers of resilience to climate change in rural Ethiopia by examining actions taken at household and district/village level:

- Using existing survey data together with satellite measures of drought exposure and vegetation resilience
- Conducting a particularly targeted survey on resilience enhancing actions
- Analyzing the impacts of large scale interventions including the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and Sustainable Land Management Practices (SLPM)

How to define resilience?

IPCC (2012) – and others:

“Resilience is the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner”

How to identify resilience in practice?

- Analysing existing survey data in combination with satellite data on weather and climate
- Example of drought measure and survey points- see map on the left

The project has three long term objectives:

1. Increasing existing knowledge about the drivers of resilience in Ethiopia;
2. Improved policies relating to resilience and hence improvement in the living conditions of smallholder farmers in Ethiopia;
3. Mutual learning and enhanced local human and institutional capacity to analyze the issue of resilience;

Work packages:

- WP1: Identifying Resilience at Different Levels
- WP2: Identifying Resilience enhancing Local Innovative Actions
- WP3: Assessing the Impact of Local Innovative Actions identified in WP2
- WP4: Assessing the Impact of the Productive Safety Net Program on Household Resilience
- WP5: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Sustainable Land Management Practices (SLPM)