Harmonising Company Laws within the EU
An increasing takeover activity within the European Union extends the external pressure upon firms to allocate production resources efficiently and yields at least three wealth enlarging effects. First, it creates a better standard for corporate governance, since poor managers would be replaced more often. Second, it increases the focus on value maximisation, since firms that do not create maximum value would be targets for either friendly or hostile takeovers. Third, it creates a more efficient allocation of the production resources between European countries, due to an increasing number of cross-border takeovers.
You can read the Working paper Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in European Ownership, CEBR, 2009, Morten Bennedsend & Kasper Meisner Nielsen here
and below you can read the Journal articles
The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms, European Journal of Law and Economics, 17: 259–283, 2004, Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen here
Svensk selskabsstyring under pres: Effekter af at harmonisere selskabslovgivningen i EU, Ekonomisk debatt 2/2003, Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen here