When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya. / Markussen, Thomas; Mbuvi, Kitavi .

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Markussen, T & Mbuvi, K 2011 'When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. <https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1119.pdf/>

APA

Markussen, T., & Mbuvi, K. (2011). When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1119.pdf/

Vancouver

Markussen T, Mbuvi K. When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2011.

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Mbuvi, Kitavi . / When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Bibtex

@techreport{0a34e7f382ea49bc8cabe60bdc0a8982,
title = "When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence?: Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya",
abstract = "Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest. ",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Kitavi Mbuvi",
note = "JEL classification: D74 H4 J6 O55",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence?

T2 - Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Mbuvi, Kitavi

N1 - JEL classification: D74 H4 J6 O55

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

AB - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

M3 - Working paper

BT - When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence?

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 37805840