What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous?

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous? / Cassidy, J. David; Leth-Petersen, Søren; Pons Rotger, Gabriel.

I: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Bind 85, Nr. 3, 2018, s. 635-662.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Cassidy, JD, Leth-Petersen, S & Pons Rotger, G 2018, 'What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous?', Journal of Risk and Insurance, bind 85, nr. 3, s. 635-662. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12169

APA

Cassidy, J. D., Leth-Petersen, S., & Pons Rotger, G. (2018). What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 85(3), 635-662. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12169

Vancouver

Cassidy JD, Leth-Petersen S, Pons Rotger G. What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous? Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2018;85(3):635-662. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12169

Author

Cassidy, J. David ; Leth-Petersen, Søren ; Pons Rotger, Gabriel. / What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous?. I: Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2018 ; Bind 85, Nr. 3. s. 635-662.

Bibtex

@article{b7ef85e0384641a28ef46e6beb13f4cb,
title = "What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous?",
abstract = "We examine the effect of a Danish reform in 2002 that increased compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity and extended the period when whiplash claimants could get compensation for temporary loss of earnings. The first is subject to extensive state verification by the government while the second is not. Using weekly data about disability, drug purchases, and use of health services during 1996–2007, we find that the reform increased the proportion on temporary disability by about 18 percent without a matching increase in drug purchases or the use of health services. We find no effect of compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity.",
author = "Cassidy, {J. David} and S{\o}ren Leth-Petersen and {Pons Rotger}, Gabriel",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1111/jori.12169",
language = "English",
volume = "85",
pages = "635--662",
journal = "Journal of Risk and Insurance",
issn = "0022-4367",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - What Happens When Compensation for Whiplash Claims Is Made More Generous?

AU - Cassidy, J. David

AU - Leth-Petersen, Søren

AU - Pons Rotger, Gabriel

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - We examine the effect of a Danish reform in 2002 that increased compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity and extended the period when whiplash claimants could get compensation for temporary loss of earnings. The first is subject to extensive state verification by the government while the second is not. Using weekly data about disability, drug purchases, and use of health services during 1996–2007, we find that the reform increased the proportion on temporary disability by about 18 percent without a matching increase in drug purchases or the use of health services. We find no effect of compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity.

AB - We examine the effect of a Danish reform in 2002 that increased compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity and extended the period when whiplash claimants could get compensation for temporary loss of earnings. The first is subject to extensive state verification by the government while the second is not. Using weekly data about disability, drug purchases, and use of health services during 1996–2007, we find that the reform increased the proportion on temporary disability by about 18 percent without a matching increase in drug purchases or the use of health services. We find no effect of compensation for permanent loss of earnings capacity.

U2 - 10.1111/jori.12169

DO - 10.1111/jori.12169

M3 - Journal article

VL - 85

SP - 635

EP - 662

JO - Journal of Risk and Insurance

JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance

SN - 0022-4367

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 162356280