Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities

Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities : experimental evidence. / Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Markussen, Thomas; Meraglia, Simone.

I: Social Choice and Welfare, Bind 58, 27.10.2021, s. 619–677.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Cobo-Reyes, R, Katz, G, Markussen, T & Meraglia, S 2021, 'Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence', Social Choice and Welfare, bind 58, s. 619–677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6

APA

Cobo-Reyes, R., Katz, G., Markussen, T., & Meraglia, S. (2021). Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence. Social Choice and Welfare, 58, 619–677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6

Vancouver

Cobo-Reyes R, Katz G, Markussen T, Meraglia S. Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence. Social Choice and Welfare. 2021 okt. 27;58:619–677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6

Author

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón ; Katz, Gabriel ; Markussen, Thomas ; Meraglia, Simone. / Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities : experimental evidence. I: Social Choice and Welfare. 2021 ; Bind 58. s. 619–677.

Bibtex

@article{9f176c70d594484382574fa7be8dc4e0,

title = "Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence",

abstract = "We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.",

author = "Ram{\'o}n Cobo-Reyes and Gabriel Katz and Thomas Markussen and Simone Meraglia",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.",

year = "2021",

month = oct,

day = "27",

doi = "10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6",

language = "English",

volume = "58",

pages = "619–677",

journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",

issn = "0176-1714",

publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities

T2 - experimental evidence

AU - Cobo-Reyes, Ramón

AU - Katz, Gabriel

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Meraglia, Simone

PY - 2021/10/27

Y1 - 2021/10/27

N2 - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.

AB - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6

DO - 10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85118130967

VL - 58

SP - 619

EP - 677

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

ER -

ID: 285316424

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