Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model

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Standard

Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model. / Midjord, Rune; Rodriguez Barraquer, Tomas; Valasek, Justin.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 104, 2017, s. 430-443.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Midjord, R, Rodriguez Barraquer, T & Valasek, J 2017, 'Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 104, s. 430-443. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

APA

Midjord, R., Rodriguez Barraquer, T., & Valasek, J. (2017). Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 430-443. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

Vancouver

Midjord R, Rodriguez Barraquer T, Valasek J. Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model. Games and Economic Behavior. 2017;104:430-443. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

Author

Midjord, Rune ; Rodriguez Barraquer, Tomas ; Valasek, Justin. / Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 ; Bind 104. s. 430-443.

Bibtex

@article{377532dd93f5406d8cb08fb71790b2a8,
title = "Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model",
abstract = "We consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee's decision, each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he/she votes in favor of an ill-fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial. We find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology. In the standard Condorcet framework experts' signals are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world, implying that the state of the world is approximated with arbitrary precision by a sufficiently large number of signals. Under this assumption, any combination of disesteem payoffs leads to acceptance with too high a probability. However, if this assumption is relaxed, depending on the relative size of the disesteem payoffs the committee may accept or reject the innovation with too high a probability.",
keywords = "Committees, Information aggregation, Disesteem payoffs",
author = "Rune Midjord and {Rodriguez Barraquer}, Tomas and Justin Valasek",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003",
language = "English",
volume = "104",
pages = "430--443",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model

AU - Midjord, Rune

AU - Rodriguez Barraquer, Tomas

AU - Valasek, Justin

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - We consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee's decision, each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he/she votes in favor of an ill-fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial. We find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology. In the standard Condorcet framework experts' signals are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world, implying that the state of the world is approximated with arbitrary precision by a sufficiently large number of signals. Under this assumption, any combination of disesteem payoffs leads to acceptance with too high a probability. However, if this assumption is relaxed, depending on the relative size of the disesteem payoffs the committee may accept or reject the innovation with too high a probability.

AB - We consider a committee of experts that decides to approve or reject an innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the correctness of the committee's decision, each expert receives disesteem payoffs if he/she votes in favor of an ill-fated innovation or votes against an innovation that proves to be beneficial. We find that the predictions of the model are sensitive to the signal technology. In the standard Condorcet framework experts' signals are i.i.d. conditional on the state of the world, implying that the state of the world is approximated with arbitrary precision by a sufficiently large number of signals. Under this assumption, any combination of disesteem payoffs leads to acceptance with too high a probability. However, if this assumption is relaxed, depending on the relative size of the disesteem payoffs the committee may accept or reject the innovation with too high a probability.

KW - Committees

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Disesteem payoffs

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 104

SP - 430

EP - 443

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 196712994