Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice

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Standard

Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice. / Mechtenberg, Lydia; Tyran, Jean Robert.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 116, 2019, s. 241-259.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Mechtenberg, L & Tyran, JR 2019, 'Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 116, s. 241-259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002

APA

Mechtenberg, L., & Tyran, J. R. (2019). Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice. Games and Economic Behavior, 116, 241-259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002

Vancouver

Mechtenberg L, Tyran JR. Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice. Games and Economic Behavior. 2019;116:241-259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002

Author

Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Tyran, Jean Robert. / Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 2019 ; Bind 116. s. 241-259.

Bibtex

@article{0b70607e7e5d4917bc40b4feda0c4474,
title = "Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice",
abstract = "The efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common-interest issues critically depends on voter motivation, i.e., on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common-interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects.",
keywords = "Experiment, Information acquisition, Information aggregation, Voting",
author = "Lydia Mechtenberg and Tyran, {Jean Robert}",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002",
language = "English",
volume = "116",
pages = "241--259",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice

AU - Mechtenberg, Lydia

AU - Tyran, Jean Robert

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common-interest issues critically depends on voter motivation, i.e., on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common-interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects.

AB - The efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common-interest issues critically depends on voter motivation, i.e., on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common-interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects.

KW - Experiment

KW - Information acquisition

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Voting

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85066407707

VL - 116

SP - 241

EP - 259

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 241100869