Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games : Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. / Albæk, Svend; Overgaard, P. Baltzer.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1994.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Albæk, S & Overgaard, PB 1994 'Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Albæk, S., & Overgaard, P. B. (1994). Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Albæk S, Overgaard PB. Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 1994.

Author

Albæk, Svend ; Overgaard, P. Baltzer. / Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games : Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1994.

Bibtex

@techreport{0ff770b074c711dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets",
author = "Svend Alb{\ae}k and Overgaard, {P. Baltzer}",
year = "1994",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games

T2 - Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets

AU - Albæk, Svend

AU - Overgaard, P. Baltzer

PY - 1994

Y1 - 1994

M3 - Working paper

BT - Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 161829