The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown. / Johannesen, Niels; Zucman, Gabriel.

I: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Bind 6, Nr. 1, 2014, s. 65-91.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Johannesen, N & Zucman, G 2014, 'The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, bind 6, nr. 1, s. 65-91. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.65

APA

Johannesen, N., & Zucman, G. (2014). The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 65-91. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.65

Vancouver

Johannesen N, Zucman G. The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2014;6(1):65-91. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.65

Author

Johannesen, Niels ; Zucman, Gabriel. / The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown. I: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2014 ; Bind 6, Nr. 1. s. 65-91.

Bibtex

@article{99417f2bb8764b0e91f4af9b976deaf8,
title = "The End of Bank Secrecy?: An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown",
abstract = "During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.",
author = "Niels Johannesen and Gabriel Zucman",
note = "Jel Classification: G21, G28, H26, H87, K34",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1257/pol.6.1.65",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "65--91",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Economic Policy",
issn = "1945-7731",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The End of Bank Secrecy?

T2 - An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown

AU - Johannesen, Niels

AU - Zucman, Gabriel

N1 - Jel Classification: G21, G28, H26, H87, K34

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.

AB - During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.

U2 - 10.1257/pol.6.1.65

DO - 10.1257/pol.6.1.65

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 65

EP - 91

JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

SN - 1945-7731

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 99358941