Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Taxing Hidden Wealth : The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. / Johannesen, Niels; Langetieg, Patrick ; Reck, Daniel; Risch, Max ; Slemrod, Joel .

National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Johannesen, N, Langetieg, P, Reck, D, Risch, M & Slemrod, J 2018 'Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts' National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w24366

APA

Johannesen, N., Langetieg, P., Reck, D., Risch, M., & Slemrod, J. (2018). Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w24366

Vancouver

Johannesen N, Langetieg P, Reck D, Risch M, Slemrod J. Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. National Bureau of Economic Research. 2018 mar. https://doi.org/10.3386/w24366

Author

Johannesen, Niels ; Langetieg, Patrick ; Reck, Daniel ; Risch, Max ; Slemrod, Joel . / Taxing Hidden Wealth : The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.

Bibtex

@techreport{14dc7ee1366b42bbb1b0f0e507c0f7da,
title = "Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts",
abstract = "In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of the enforcement efforts on taxpayers{\textquoteright} reporting of offshore accounts and income. Enforcement caused approximately 60,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of around $120 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. The disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries whose institutions facilitate tax evasion. The enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2.5-$4 billion corresponding to $0.7-$1.0 billion in additional tax revenue.",
author = "Niels Johannesen and Patrick Langetieg and Daniel Reck and Max Risch and Joel Slemrod",
year = "2018",
month = mar,
doi = "10.3386/w24366",
language = "English",
volume = "NBER Working Paper No. 24366",
publisher = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Taxing Hidden Wealth

T2 - The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts

AU - Johannesen, Niels

AU - Langetieg, Patrick

AU - Reck, Daniel

AU - Risch, Max

AU - Slemrod, Joel

PY - 2018/3

Y1 - 2018/3

N2 - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of the enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. Enforcement caused approximately 60,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of around $120 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. The disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries whose institutions facilitate tax evasion. The enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2.5-$4 billion corresponding to $0.7-$1.0 billion in additional tax revenue.

AB - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of the enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. Enforcement caused approximately 60,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of around $120 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. The disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries whose institutions facilitate tax evasion. The enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2.5-$4 billion corresponding to $0.7-$1.0 billion in additional tax revenue.

U2 - 10.3386/w24366

DO - 10.3386/w24366

M3 - Working paper

VL - NBER Working Paper No. 24366

BT - Taxing Hidden Wealth

PB - National Bureau of Economic Research

ER -

ID: 231707859