Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

Tax me if you can : An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty. / Jacobsen, Catrine; Piovesan, Marco.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 124, 2016, s. 7-14.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jacobsen, C & Piovesan, M 2016, 'Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, bind 124, s. 7-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009

APA

Jacobsen, C., & Piovesan, M. (2016). Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 124, 7-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009

Vancouver

Jacobsen C, Piovesan M. Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016;124:7-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009

Author

Jacobsen, Catrine ; Piovesan, Marco. / Tax me if you can : An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty. I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016 ; Bind 124. s. 7-14.

Bibtex

@article{ec3861726dcc417ab7417373b20826e9,
title = "Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty",
abstract = "In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty.",
author = "Catrine Jacobsen and Marco Piovesan",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009",
language = "English",
volume = "124",
pages = "7--14",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tax me if you can

T2 - An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty

AU - Jacobsen, Catrine

AU - Piovesan, Marco

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty.

AB - In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.009

M3 - Journal article

VL - 124

SP - 7

EP - 14

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 143913230