State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. / Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Kamei, K, Putterman, L & Tyran, J-R 2011 'State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Kamei, K., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J-R. (2011). State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Kamei K, Putterman L, Tyran J-R. State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2011.

Author

Kamei, Kenju ; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Bibtex

@techreport{ae84d041883b4707953a480f33853ccd,
title = "State or Nature?: Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods",
abstract = "The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, sanction, social dilemma, voluntary contribution mechanism, punishment, experiment",
author = "Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran",
note = "JEL classification: C92, C91, D03, D71, H41",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - State or Nature?

T2 - Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

AU - Kamei, Kenju

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

N1 - JEL classification: C92, C91, D03, D71, H41

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.

AB - The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - sanction

KW - social dilemma

KW - voluntary contribution mechanism

KW - punishment, experiment

M3 - Working paper

BT - State or Nature?

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 32470962