Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.
TidsskriftThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)1-29
StatusUdgivet - jan. 2017

ID: 173938041