Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on Bonus Schemes, Competition, and Altruism
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on Bonus Schemes, Competition, and Altruism. / Andersson, Ola; Holm, Hakan J.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik.
2014.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on Bonus Schemes, Competition, and Altruism
AU - Andersson, Ola
AU - Holm, Hakan J.
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
AU - Wengström, Erik
PY - 2014/7/17
Y1 - 2014/7/17
N2 - We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits.
AB - We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits.
KW - Incentives
KW - competition
KW - hedging
KW - risk taking
KW - social preferences
UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466988
M3 - Working paper
T3 - IFN Working Paper
BT - Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on Bonus Schemes, Competition, and Altruism
ER -
ID: 241647820