Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

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Standard

Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. / Jensen, Thomas.

I: Public Choice, Bind 141, Nr. 1-2, 2009, s. 213-232.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jensen, T 2009, 'Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition', Public Choice, bind 141, nr. 1-2, s. 213-232. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4

APA

Jensen, T. (2009). Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. Public Choice, 141(1-2), 213-232. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4

Vancouver

Jensen T. Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. Public Choice. 2009;141(1-2):213-232. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4

Author

Jensen, Thomas. / Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. I: Public Choice. 2009 ; Bind 141, Nr. 1-2. s. 213-232.

Bibtex

@article{5669bdc0918211de8bc9000ea68e967b,
title = "Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition",
abstract = "Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, voter perception, projection",
author = "Thomas Jensen",
note = "JEL Classification: D72, D83",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4",
language = "English",
volume = "141",
pages = "213--232",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

AU - Jensen, Thomas

N1 - JEL Classification: D72, D83

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.

AB - Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - voter perception

KW - projection

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4

DO - 10.1007/s11127-009-9449-4

M3 - Journal article

VL - 141

SP - 213

EP - 232

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -

ID: 13950074