Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments

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Standard

Political and judicial checks on corruption : evidence from American state governments. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer.

I: Economics & Politics, Bind 20, Nr. 1, 2008, s. 33-61.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Alt, JE & Lassen, DD 2008, 'Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments', Economics & Politics, bind 20, nr. 1, s. 33-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

APA

Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2008). Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments. Economics & Politics, 20(1), 33-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

Vancouver

Alt JE, Lassen DD. Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments. Economics & Politics. 2008;20(1):33-61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

Author

Alt, James E. ; Lassen, David Dreyer. / Political and judicial checks on corruption : evidence from American state governments. I: Economics & Politics. 2008 ; Bind 20, Nr. 1. s. 33-61.

Bibtex

@article{456c26f0187c11ddbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments",
abstract = "This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, korruption, politiske institutioner, magtens tredeling, corruption, political institutions, separation of powers",
author = "Alt, {James E.} and Lassen, {David Dreyer}",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "33--61",
journal = "Economics and Politics",
issn = "0954-1985",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political and judicial checks on corruption

T2 - evidence from American state governments

AU - Alt, James E.

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.

AB - This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - korruption

KW - politiske institutioner

KW - magtens tredeling

KW - corruption

KW - political institutions

KW - separation of powers

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 33

EP - 61

JO - Economics and Politics

JF - Economics and Politics

SN - 0954-1985

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 3941584