Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

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Standard

Peer Effects in Legislative Voting. / Harmon, Nikolaj; Fisman, Raymond; Kamenica, Emir.

I: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Bind 11, Nr. 4, 10.2019, s. 156-180.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Harmon, N, Fisman, R & Kamenica, E 2019, 'Peer Effects in Legislative Voting', American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, bind 11, nr. 4, s. 156-180. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180286

APA

Harmon, N., Fisman, R., & Kamenica, E. (2019). Peer Effects in Legislative Voting. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(4), 156-180. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180286

Vancouver

Harmon N, Fisman R, Kamenica E. Peer Effects in Legislative Voting. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2019 okt.;11(4):156-180. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180286

Author

Harmon, Nikolaj ; Fisman, Raymond ; Kamenica, Emir. / Peer Effects in Legislative Voting. I: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 2019 ; Bind 11, Nr. 4. s. 156-180.

Bibtex

@article{f491bbd587ef451a91a21c2c5aa7328e,
title = "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting",
abstract = "We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently. ",
author = "Nikolaj Harmon and Raymond Fisman and Emir Kamenica",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1257/app.20180286",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "156--180",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Applied Economics",
issn = "1945-7782",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Peer Effects in Legislative Voting

AU - Harmon, Nikolaj

AU - Fisman, Raymond

AU - Kamenica, Emir

PY - 2019/10

Y1 - 2019/10

N2 - We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently.

AB - We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote. Peer effects are markedly stronger among pairs of women, MEP pairs from the same country, and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the parliament's two venues (Brussels and Strasbourg), we show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in the past disagree less even when they are not seated adjacently.

U2 - 10.1257/app.20180286

DO - 10.1257/app.20180286

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 156

EP - 180

JO - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

JF - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

SN - 1945-7782

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 232066617