Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining. / Jensen, Thomas; Madum, Andreas.
Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2014.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining
AU - Jensen, Thomas
AU - Madum, Andreas
N1 - JEL Classification: D72
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party or candidate are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimism about future electoral outcomes can make costly bargaining delay look more favorable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Therefore, party decision makers should take optimism among partisans into account when bargaining. In this paper we use game theoretic modeling to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not necessarily cause inefficient bargaining delay
AB - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party or candidate are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimism about future electoral outcomes can make costly bargaining delay look more favorable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Therefore, party decision makers should take optimism among partisans into account when bargaining. In this paper we use game theoretic modeling to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not necessarily cause inefficient bargaining delay
M3 - Working paper
T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)
BT - Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining
PB - Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet
CY - Kbh.
ER -
ID: 104026751