Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining. / Jensen, Thomas; Madum, Andreas.

Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2014.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Jensen, T & Madum, A 2014 'Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining' Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, Kbh. <https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2014/1405.pdf>

APA

Jensen, T., & Madum, A. (2014). Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining. Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Bind 2014 Nr. 05 https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2014/1405.pdf

Vancouver

Jensen T, Madum A. Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining. Kbh.: Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet. 2014.

Author

Jensen, Thomas ; Madum, Andreas. / Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining. Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2014. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 05, Bind 2014).

Bibtex

@techreport{a55160b07b364597a509b8ea0c5f5b8a,
title = "Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining",
abstract = "Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party or candidate are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimism about future electoral outcomes can make costly bargaining delay look more favorable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Therefore, party decision makers should take optimism among partisans into account when bargaining. In this paper we use game theoretic modeling to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not necessarily cause inefficient bargaining delay",
author = "Thomas Jensen and Andreas Madum",
note = "JEL Classification: D72",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "05",
publisher = "{\O}konomisk institut, K{\o}benhavns Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
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RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining

AU - Jensen, Thomas

AU - Madum, Andreas

N1 - JEL Classification: D72

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party or candidate are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimism about future electoral outcomes can make costly bargaining delay look more favorable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Therefore, party decision makers should take optimism among partisans into account when bargaining. In this paper we use game theoretic modeling to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not necessarily cause inefficient bargaining delay

AB - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party or candidate are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimism about future electoral outcomes can make costly bargaining delay look more favorable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Therefore, party decision makers should take optimism among partisans into account when bargaining. In this paper we use game theoretic modeling to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not necessarily cause inefficient bargaining delay

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining

PB - Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet

CY - Kbh.

ER -

ID: 104026751