Partisan optimism and political bargaining

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Standard

Partisan optimism and political bargaining. / Jensen, Thomas; Madum, Andreas.

I: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Bind 29, Nr. 2, 04.2017, s. 191-213.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jensen, T & Madum, A 2017, 'Partisan optimism and political bargaining', Journal of Theoretical Politics, bind 29, nr. 2, s. 191-213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630435

APA

Jensen, T., & Madum, A. (2017). Partisan optimism and political bargaining. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 29(2), 191-213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630435

Vancouver

Jensen T, Madum A. Partisan optimism and political bargaining. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2017 apr.;29(2):191-213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630435

Author

Jensen, Thomas ; Madum, Andreas. / Partisan optimism and political bargaining. I: Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2017 ; Bind 29, Nr. 2. s. 191-213.

Bibtex

@article{9f55e4039a93434f89b8c01328831337,
title = "Partisan optimism and political bargaining",
abstract = "Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimistic electoral expectations make costly bargaining delay look more favourable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Party decision makers should take this into account when bargaining. We set up and analyse a simple game theoretic model to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not in themselves cause inefficient bargaining delay.",
keywords = "Bargaining, elections, formal modelling, parties, partisan optimism, Faculty of Social Sciences, Bargaining, Elections, Formal modelling, Parties, Partisan optimism",
author = "Thomas Jensen and Andreas Madum",
year = "2017",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1177/0951629816630435",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "191--213",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical Politics",
issn = "0951-6298",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Partisan optimism and political bargaining

AU - Jensen, Thomas

AU - Madum, Andreas

PY - 2017/4

Y1 - 2017/4

N2 - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimistic electoral expectations make costly bargaining delay look more favourable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Party decision makers should take this into account when bargaining. We set up and analyse a simple game theoretic model to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not in themselves cause inefficient bargaining delay.

AB - Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimistic electoral expectations make costly bargaining delay look more favourable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Party decision makers should take this into account when bargaining. We set up and analyse a simple game theoretic model to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not in themselves cause inefficient bargaining delay.

KW - Bargaining

KW - elections

KW - formal modelling

KW - parties

KW - partisan optimism

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Bargaining

KW - Elections

KW - Formal modelling

KW - Parties

KW - Partisan optimism

U2 - 10.1177/0951629816630435

DO - 10.1177/0951629816630435

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 191

EP - 213

JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics

JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics

SN - 0951-6298

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 178700050