One Cow, One Vote

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Standard

One Cow, One Vote. / Albæk, Svend; Schultz, Christian.

I: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bind 99, Nr. 4, 1997, s. 597-615.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Albæk, S & Schultz, C 1997, 'One Cow, One Vote', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, bind 99, nr. 4, s. 597-615. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00083

APA

Albæk, S., & Schultz, C. (1997). One Cow, One Vote. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(4), 597-615. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00083

Vancouver

Albæk S, Schultz C. One Cow, One Vote. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1997;99(4):597-615. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00083

Author

Albæk, Svend ; Schultz, Christian. / One Cow, One Vote. I: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1997 ; Bind 99, Nr. 4. s. 597-615.

Bibtex

@article{b3e2984074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "One Cow, One Vote",
abstract = "We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the number of votes and the cost of the investment are distributed among the farmers. It is shown that in a variety of settings, there is no reason to suppose that voting rules favoring large farmers - {"}one cow, one vote{"} rules - are more efficient than simple majority rule",
author = "Svend Alb{\ae}k and Christian Schultz",
year = "1997",
doi = "10.1111/1467-9442.00083",
language = "English",
volume = "99",
pages = "597--615",
journal = "Scandinavian Journal of Economics",
issn = "0347-0520",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - One Cow, One Vote

AU - Albæk, Svend

AU - Schultz, Christian

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the number of votes and the cost of the investment are distributed among the farmers. It is shown that in a variety of settings, there is no reason to suppose that voting rules favoring large farmers - "one cow, one vote" rules - are more efficient than simple majority rule

AB - We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the number of votes and the cost of the investment are distributed among the farmers. It is shown that in a variety of settings, there is no reason to suppose that voting rules favoring large farmers - "one cow, one vote" rules - are more efficient than simple majority rule

U2 - 10.1111/1467-9442.00083

DO - 10.1111/1467-9442.00083

M3 - Journal article

VL - 99

SP - 597

EP - 615

JO - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

SN - 0347-0520

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 155836