Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › fagfællebedømt
This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Social Choice and Welfare |
Vol/bind | 15 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 455-467 |
ISSN | 0176-1714 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1998 |
ID: 155267