Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment: A Laboratory Experiment

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Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment : A Laboratory Experiment. / Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele; Spitzer, Florian; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 131, Nr. Part B, 2016, s. 78–105.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Huck, S, Lünser, G, Spitzer, F & Tyran, J-RK 2016, 'Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment: A Laboratory Experiment', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, bind 131, nr. Part B, s. 78–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009

APA

Huck, S., Lünser, G., Spitzer, F., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2016). Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment: A Laboratory Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 131(Part B), 78–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009

Vancouver

Huck S, Lünser G, Spitzer F, Tyran J-RK. Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment: A Laboratory Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016;131(Part B):78–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009

Author

Huck, Steffen ; Lünser, Gabriele ; Spitzer, Florian ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment : A Laboratory Experiment. I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2016 ; Bind 131, Nr. Part B. s. 78–105.

Bibtex

@article{431d416f67a34172ad08b83dd3218769,
title = "Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment: A Laboratory Experiment",
abstract = "In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician, including observability of physicians{\textquoteright} market shares. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician knows the appropriate treatment, the patient does not. Even after a consultation, the patient is not sure whether he received the right treatment or whether he was perhaps overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.",
author = "Steffen Huck and Gabriele L{\"u}nser and Florian Spitzer and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009",
language = "English",
volume = "131",
pages = "78–105",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "Part B",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment

T2 - A Laboratory Experiment

AU - Huck, Steffen

AU - Lünser, Gabriele

AU - Spitzer, Florian

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician, including observability of physicians’ market shares. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician knows the appropriate treatment, the patient does not. Even after a consultation, the patient is not sure whether he received the right treatment or whether he was perhaps overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.

AB - In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician, including observability of physicians’ market shares. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician knows the appropriate treatment, the patient does not. Even after a consultation, the patient is not sure whether he received the right treatment or whether he was perhaps overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.009

M3 - Journal article

VL - 131

SP - 78

EP - 105

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

IS - Part B

ER -

ID: 164332155