Learning, tracing, and risk dominance

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Standard

Learning, tracing, and risk dominance. / Hendon, Ebbe; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Nielsen, Michael Teit; Sloth, Birgitte.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 7, Nr. 3, 1994, s. 332-345.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Hendon, E, Jacobsen, HJ, Nielsen, MT & Sloth, B 1994, 'Learning, tracing, and risk dominance', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 7, nr. 3, s. 332-345. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1055

APA

Hendon, E., Jacobsen, H. J., Nielsen, M. T., & Sloth, B. (1994). Learning, tracing, and risk dominance. Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), 332-345. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1055

Vancouver

Hendon E, Jacobsen HJ, Nielsen MT, Sloth B. Learning, tracing, and risk dominance. Games and Economic Behavior. 1994;7(3):332-345. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1055

Author

Hendon, Ebbe ; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ; Nielsen, Michael Teit ; Sloth, Birgitte. / Learning, tracing, and risk dominance. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 1994 ; Bind 7, Nr. 3. s. 332-345.

Bibtex

@article{c4f15ae074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Learning, tracing, and risk dominance",
abstract = "This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten",
author = "Ebbe Hendon and Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen} and Nielsen, {Michael Teit} and Birgitte Sloth",
note = "JEL Classification: C72",
year = "1994",
doi = "10.1006/game.1994.1055",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "332--345",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Learning, tracing, and risk dominance

AU - Hendon, Ebbe

AU - Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Nielsen, Michael Teit

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72

PY - 1994

Y1 - 1994

N2 - This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten

AB - This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight assigned to this prior, and the equilibrium selected is examined. As the weight increases, the relation between the prior and the equilibrium selected becomes almost identical to that of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi. In this way the learning process supports the concept of risk dominance of Harsanyi and Selten

U2 - 10.1006/game.1994.1055

DO - 10.1006/game.1994.1055

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 332

EP - 345

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 156799