It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal

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Standard

It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal. / Bucciol, Alessandro; Montinari, Natalia; Piovesan, Marco.

I: Ecological Economics, Bind 157, 03.2019, s. 394-401.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Bucciol, A, Montinari, N & Piovesan, M 2019, 'It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal', Ecological Economics, bind 157, s. 394-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013

APA

Bucciol, A., Montinari, N., & Piovesan, M. (2019). It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal. Ecological Economics, 157, 394-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013

Vancouver

Bucciol A, Montinari N, Piovesan M. It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal. Ecological Economics. 2019 mar.;157:394-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013

Author

Bucciol, Alessandro ; Montinari, Natalia ; Piovesan, Marco. / It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal. I: Ecological Economics. 2019 ; Bind 157. s. 394-401.

Bibtex

@article{20411d6ae6754624ae31c6bb05636002,
title = "It Wasn't Me!: Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal",
abstract = "We study the effect of visibility of individual action on free riding using field data on household waste sorting. In our sample households pay an annual fee proportional to the number of emptyings of their bin for unsorted waste. We exploit the variation in the bin sharing policy to estimate the production of unsorted waste when bins are shared or not. We find that unsorted waste production is lower when two households share the same bin compared to households not sharing the bin. This result does not hold when more than two households share the same bin, possibly due to lack of visibility of the individual action. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that peer monitoring can promote virtuous behavior when monetary incentives cannot be used to solve social dilemmas.",
keywords = "Anonymity, Free Riding, Visibility, Waste Management, Waste Sorting",
author = "Alessandro Bucciol and Natalia Montinari and Marco Piovesan",
year = "2019",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013",
language = "English",
volume = "157",
pages = "394--401",
journal = "Ecological Economics",
issn = "0921-8009",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - It Wasn't Me!

T2 - Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Disposal

AU - Bucciol, Alessandro

AU - Montinari, Natalia

AU - Piovesan, Marco

PY - 2019/3

Y1 - 2019/3

N2 - We study the effect of visibility of individual action on free riding using field data on household waste sorting. In our sample households pay an annual fee proportional to the number of emptyings of their bin for unsorted waste. We exploit the variation in the bin sharing policy to estimate the production of unsorted waste when bins are shared or not. We find that unsorted waste production is lower when two households share the same bin compared to households not sharing the bin. This result does not hold when more than two households share the same bin, possibly due to lack of visibility of the individual action. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that peer monitoring can promote virtuous behavior when monetary incentives cannot be used to solve social dilemmas.

AB - We study the effect of visibility of individual action on free riding using field data on household waste sorting. In our sample households pay an annual fee proportional to the number of emptyings of their bin for unsorted waste. We exploit the variation in the bin sharing policy to estimate the production of unsorted waste when bins are shared or not. We find that unsorted waste production is lower when two households share the same bin compared to households not sharing the bin. This result does not hold when more than two households share the same bin, possibly due to lack of visibility of the individual action. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that peer monitoring can promote virtuous behavior when monetary incentives cannot be used to solve social dilemmas.

KW - Anonymity

KW - Free Riding

KW - Visibility

KW - Waste Management

KW - Waste Sorting

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058631831&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013

DO - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.12.013

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85058631831

VL - 157

SP - 394

EP - 401

JO - Ecological Economics

JF - Ecological Economics

SN - 0921-8009

ER -

ID: 213669641