Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

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Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution. / Höchtl, Wolfgang; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 56, Nr. 7, 2012, s. 1406-1421.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Höchtl, W, Sausgruber, R & Tyran, J-RK 2012, 'Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution', European Economic Review, bind 56, nr. 7, s. 1406-1421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

APA

Höchtl, W., Sausgruber, R., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2012). Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution. European Economic Review, 56(7), 1406-1421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

Vancouver

Höchtl W, Sausgruber R, Tyran J-RK. Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution. European Economic Review. 2012;56(7):1406-1421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

Author

Höchtl, Wolfgang ; Sausgruber, Rupert ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution. I: European Economic Review. 2012 ; Bind 56, Nr. 7. s. 1406-1421.

Bibtex

@article{a485ab2ab62d498e916098c10fd4210f,
title = "Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution",
abstract = "Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Redistribution, Self interest, Inequality aversion, Median voter, Experiment",
author = "Wolfgang H{\"o}chtl and Rupert Sausgruber and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
note = "JEL Classification: A13; C9; D72",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "1406--1421",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "7",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

AU - Höchtl, Wolfgang

AU - Sausgruber, Rupert

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL Classification: A13; C9; D72

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

AB - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Redistribution

KW - Self interest

KW - Inequality aversion

KW - Median voter

KW - Experiment

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 23564967

VL - 56

SP - 1406

EP - 1421

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 7

ER -

ID: 43870228