Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Dokumenter
- mic.20180107
Forlagets udgivne version, 741 KB, PDF-dokument
In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics |
Vol/bind | 12 |
Udgave nummer | 4 |
Sider (fra-til) | 144-169 |
Antal sider | 26 |
ISSN | 1945-7669 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - nov. 2020 |
Antal downloads er baseret på statistik fra Google Scholar og www.ku.dk
ID: 254995848