Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests. / Lagerlöf, Johan.

2017.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Lagerlöf, J 2017 'Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests'. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3043104>

APA

Lagerlöf, J. (2017). Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Nr. 17-20 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3043104

Vancouver

Lagerlöf J. Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests. 2017.

Author

Lagerlöf, Johan. / Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests. 2017. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 17-20).

Bibtex

@techreport{27a71cd9985842f5a2d20db4e3f00961,
title = "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests",
abstract = "In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model is very general but still yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, rent-seeking, lobbying, influence activities, multiple influence channels, producer theory, C72, D24, D72, D74, rent-seeking, lobbying, influence activities, multiple influence channels, producer theory, C72, D24, D72, D74",
author = "Johan Lagerl{\"o}f",
year = "2017",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "17-20",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests

AU - Lagerlöf, Johan

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model is very general but still yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.

AB - In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model is very general but still yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - rent-seeking

KW - lobbying

KW - influence activities

KW - multiple influence channels

KW - producer theory

KW - C72

KW - D24

KW - D72

KW - D74

KW - rent-seeking

KW - lobbying

KW - influence activities

KW - multiple influence channels

KW - producer theory

KW - C72

KW - D24

KW - D72

KW - D74

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests

ER -

ID: 190435181