Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error. / Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Wang, Liangjun.

2017.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Markussen, T, Putterman, L & Wang, L 2017 'Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error'. <https://www.economics.ku.dk/research/publications/wp/dp_2017/1714.pdf>

APA

Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Wang, L. (2017). Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Nr. 17-14 https://www.economics.ku.dk/research/publications/wp/dp_2017/1714.pdf

Vancouver

Markussen T, Putterman L, Wang L. Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error. 2017.

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Putterman, Louis ; Wang, Liangjun. / Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error. 2017. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 17-14).

Bibtex

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title = "Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error",
abstract = "We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Public goods, sanctions, information, institution, voting",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Louis Putterman and Liangjun Wang",
year = "2017",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "17-14",
type = "WorkingPaper",

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RIS

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T1 - Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Wang, Liangjun

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.

AB - We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Public goods

KW - sanctions

KW - information

KW - institution

KW - voting

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error

ER -

ID: 182540477