Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 50, Nr. 6, 2006, s. 1403-1439.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Alt, JE & Lassen, DD 2006, 'Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries', European Economic Review, bind 50, nr. 6, s. 1403-1439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001

APA

Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006). Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries. European Economic Review, 50(6), 1403-1439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001

Vancouver

Alt JE, Lassen DD. Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries. European Economic Review. 2006;50(6):1403-1439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001

Author

Alt, James E. ; Lassen, David Dreyer. / Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries. I: European Economic Review. 2006 ; Bind 50, Nr. 6. s. 1403-1439.

Bibtex

@article{a19423f0a7ae11dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries",
abstract = "Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, fiscal transparency, budgetary institutions, government debt, government deficits, fiscal policy",
author = "Alt, {James E.} and Lassen, {David Dreyer}",
note = "JEL Classification: D72, E62, H63",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "1403--1439",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

AU - Alt, James E.

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

N1 - JEL Classification: D72, E62, H63

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches

AB - Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - fiscal transparency

KW - budgetary institutions

KW - government debt

KW - government deficits

KW - fiscal policy

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 1403

EP - 1439

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 313165