Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy. / Andersen, Asger Lau; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Andersen, AL & Nielsen, LHW 2010 'Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Andersen, A. L., & Nielsen, L. H. W. (2010). Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Andersen AL, Nielsen LHW. Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2010.

Author

Andersen, Asger Lau ; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh. / Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.

Bibtex

@techreport{c7d67ff02ddd11df8ed1000ea68e967b,
title = "Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy",
abstract = "This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a broader set of countries.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, politisk {\o}konomi, procyclicality, business cycles, political economy",
author = "Andersen, {Asger Lau} and Nielsen, {Lasse Holb{\o}ll Westh}",
note = "JEL Classification: D72, E32, E62",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy

AU - Andersen, Asger Lau

AU - Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh

N1 - JEL Classification: D72, E32, E62

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a broader set of countries.

AB - This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a broader set of countries.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - politisk økonomi

KW - procyclicality

KW - business cycles

KW - political economy

M3 - Working paper

BT - Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 18585897