Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from the American states

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Standard

Enforcement and public corruption : Evidence from the American states. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer.

I: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Bind 30, Nr. 2, 01.01.2014, s. 306-338.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Alt, JE & Lassen, DD 2014, 'Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from the American states', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, bind 30, nr. 2, s. 306-338. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ews036

APA

Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2014). Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from the American states. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 30(2), 306-338. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ews036

Vancouver

Alt JE, Lassen DD. Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from the American states. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2014 jan. 1;30(2):306-338. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ews036

Author

Alt, James E. ; Lassen, David Dreyer. / Enforcement and public corruption : Evidence from the American states. I: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2014 ; Bind 30, Nr. 2. s. 306-338.

Bibtex

@article{b1ecfd759a5c43e88ede5139e78449d9,
title = "Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from the American states",
abstract = "We use panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant US Attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with system capacity arguments, we find that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously from partisan and administrative considerations, we show that this specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. We also control for and confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. We find more limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. The results are robust to various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators. (JEL D72, D73, H83, K42)",
author = "Alt, {James E.} and Lassen, {David Dreyer}",
note = "JEL classification: D72, D73, H83, K42",
year = "2014",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/jleo/ews036",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "306--338",
journal = "Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization",
issn = "8756-6222",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Enforcement and public corruption

T2 - Evidence from the American states

AU - Alt, James E.

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

N1 - JEL classification: D72, D73, H83, K42

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - We use panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant US Attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with system capacity arguments, we find that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously from partisan and administrative considerations, we show that this specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. We also control for and confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. We find more limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. The results are robust to various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators. (JEL D72, D73, H83, K42)

AB - We use panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant US Attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with system capacity arguments, we find that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously from partisan and administrative considerations, we show that this specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. We also control for and confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. We find more limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. The results are robust to various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators. (JEL D72, D73, H83, K42)

U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ews036

DO - 10.1093/jleo/ews036

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84877829074

VL - 30

SP - 306

EP - 338

JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

SN - 8756-6222

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 117254776