Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time. / Hedegaard, Morten; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Müller, Daniel; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
2019.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time
AU - Hedegaard, Morten
AU - Kerschbamer, Rudolf
AU - Müller, Daniel
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
PY - 2019/6/4
Y1 - 2019/6/4
N2 - We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.
AB - We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.
KW - distributional preferences
KW - social preferences
KW - Equality-Equivalence Test
KW - representative online experiment
KW - trust game
KW - public goods game
KW - dictator game
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3388681
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3388681
M3 - Working paper
T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)
BT - Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time
ER -
ID: 241647721