Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization

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Standard

Decreasing serial cost sharing : an axiomatic characterization. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave.

I: International Journal of Game Theory, Bind 38, Nr. 4, 2009, s. 469-479.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Hougaard, JL & Østerdal, LPR 2009, 'Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization', International Journal of Game Theory, bind 38, nr. 4, s. 469-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

APA

Hougaard, J. L., & Østerdal, L. P. R. (2009). Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), 469-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Vancouver

Hougaard JL, Østerdal LPR. Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization. International Journal of Game Theory. 2009;38(4):469-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Author

Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave. / Decreasing serial cost sharing : an axiomatic characterization. I: International Journal of Game Theory. 2009 ; Bind 38, Nr. 4. s. 469-479.

Bibtex

@article{2da69d90e32611deba73000ea68e967b,
title = "Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization",
abstract = "The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, cost allocation",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter Raahave}",
note = "JEL Classification: D23, D71, L24",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "469--479",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Decreasing serial cost sharing

T2 - an axiomatic characterization

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave

N1 - JEL Classification: D23, D71, L24

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

AB - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009-1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245-275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178-201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - cost allocation

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 38

SP - 469

EP - 479

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 16129118